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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Commercial Speech-Profes-
sional Responsibility-Lawyer Advertising: Disciplinary Pro-
ceeding Against Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320
N.W.2d 806 (1982).
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona' the United States
Supreme Court held that blanket suppression of lawyer ad-
vertising is unconstitutional.2 Subsequently, every state re-
vised its disciplinary rules to allow at least some advertising
by attorneys. In a 1977 Supreme Court Order 3 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court lifted all advertising bans, stating that
only false, misleading or deceptive advertising was prohib-
ited. Discoilinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper,4 a
case of first impression in Wisconsin, interprets Wisconsin's
liberal rule.
Marcus and Tepper, two Milwaukee attorneys, adver-
tised their firm in local newspapers by comparing their low
costs for routine legal services with those of other firms
which, they said, had high overhead, low case loads and tra-
ditionally charged by the hour.5 A complaint was filed by
the Attorneys Board of Professional Responsibility alleging
the ads were false, misleading and deceptive. The supreme
court dismissed the complaint against Marcus and Tepper
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2. Id. at 383.
3. 82 Wis. 2d xxvii (1977). The court's order provided that:
1. For a one year period beginning January 1, 1978, a lawyer may adver-
tise the lawyer's availability to provide legal services. It is professional mis-
conduct for a lawyer to use any advertisement which is false, misleading, or
deceptive.
2. Any provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the extent
that it conflicts with this order is suspended.
3. Section 256.295 [the barratry statute] is not suspended by this order
and a violation of that section is professional misconduct.
4. 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982). One advertisement bore a photo-
graph of a taxi meter and the caption "How to hire a lawyer without getting taken for
a ride." The other contained a photograph of two hands bound around the wrists
with rope and headlined "When it comes to lowering their prices, most lawyers hands
are tied."
The theme of the advertisements was that the fees of other lawyers were excessive
due to high overhead. In contrast, Marcus and Tepper claimed they opted for a low
overhead, high volume practice. Therefore, they claimed, their fees would be lower.
5. Id. at 564-67, 320 N.W.2d at 809-10.
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on the merits.6 This note will discuss the development of
lawyer advertising, present the Marcus & Tepper opinion
and analyze the impact of Marcus & Tepper on future adver-
tising by Wisconsin attorneys.
I. BACKGROUND
The formal prohibition on advertising by attorneys dates
back to 1908, when the American Bar Association adopted
its first canons of ethics.7 In 1969 the Canons of Professional
Ethics were replaced with the American Bar Association's
Code of Professional Responsibility 8 which continued the
absolute prohibition against advertising and solicitation.
Another portion of the code, however, provided that every
lawyer "should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty
to make legal counsel available."9 This responsibility to
make information concerning legal services available to the
public collided with the traditional prohibition against ad-
vertising and solicitation.10 In 1976, in the interest of serving
the public, the American Bar Association began to relax the
prohibition on advertising." The Disciplinary Rules were
amended to allow lawyers to advertise a limited amount of
information in both the classified advertising section of the
telephone directory and in law directories.' 2
6. Id. at 580, 320 N.W.2d at 816.
7. See Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 27 (1908). The informal ban on
advertising goes back much further, it has been traced to the English Inns of Court
and existed in nineteenth century America. For a discussion of the history and devel-
opment of the ban on lawyer advertising, see generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
210-15 (1953).
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE]. The Model Code was adopted in Wisconsin on Dec. 16, 1969. Wis.
Sup. Ct. Order, 43 Wis. 2d lxxv (1969). It includes both Ethical Considerations and
Disciplinary Rules. The Ethical Considerations are goals to which lawyers should
aspire; the Disciplinary Rules are mandatory.
9. MODEL CODE, supra note 8, Canon 2.
10. Boden, Five Years After Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Per-
spective, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 547, 552 (1982).
11. Comment, The Wisconsin Experience With Advertising Legal Services, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 1251, 1254. The comment includes a survey of advertising by attorneys
in the first ten months during which it was allowed.
12. The American Bar Association's Model Code, Disciplinary Rules 2-101 and




These rules were in effect when two Arizona attorneys,
John Bates and Van O'Steen, began to advertise their "legal
clinic" in a Phoenix newspaper.13 The Arizona Bar Associa-
tion initiated disciplinary proceedings and reprimanded
Bates and O'Steen. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court
rejected the claims of Bates and O'Steen that the disciplinary
rule infringed upon their first amendment rights,14 and, be-
cause it tended to limit competition, violated the Sherman
Act.' 5
The United States Supreme Court, in Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona,16 reversed the Arizona Supreme Court and held
(A) A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate in the
use of, any form of public communication that contains professionally self-
laudatory statements calculated to attract lay clients; as used herein, "public
communication" includes, but is not limited to, communication by means of
television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, or book.
(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself or his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or
magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display adver-
tisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial pub-
licity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf ....
DR 2-102
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or participate in the use of professional
cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads, telephone di-
rectory listings, law lists, legal directory listings, or similar professional notices
or devices, except that the following may be used if they are in dignified form:
(5) A listing of the office of a lawyer or law firm in the alphabetical and
classified sections of the telephone directory or directories for the geographical
area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices. . . but the list-
ing in the alphabetical section may give only the name of the lawyer or law
firm, the fact that he is a lawyer, addresses, and telephone numbers ....
(6) A listing in a reputable law list, a legal directory, a directory published
by the state, county, or local bar association, or the classified section of the
telephone company directories giving brief biographical and other informative
data ....
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101 & -102 (1976).
13. The advertisement was entitled "Do You Need a Lawyer? Legal Services at
Very Reasonable Fees," and listed a series of "routine services" provided, such as
divorce or legal separation, adoption, bankruptcy, and change of name, and the fee
charged for each. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 385 (1977).
14. In re Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, _ 555 P.2d 640, 642 (1976).
15. Id. at _ 555 P.2d at 642.
16. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Bates Court relied on its decision in Virginia Phar-
macy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), in which it declared
unconstitutional a Virginia statute which held a pharmacist guilty of "unprofessional
conduct" if he advertised prescription drug prices. The Court stated that commercial
speech of this kind was entitled to first amendment protection and found that "the
[Vol. 67:168
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that blanket suppression of advertising by attorneys violates
the free speech clause of the first amendment. The Court
rejected the Bar's arguments that such advertising would
have an adverse effect on professionalism, 7 would be inher-
ently misleading, 18 would have an adverse effect on the ad-
ministration of justice, 19 would produce undesirable
economic effects2° and would have an adverse effect on the
quality of legal services.2 ' It also rejected the contention that
a rule permitting limited advertising would be difficult to en-
force.22 The rationale behind the Bates decision was not so
much the right of attorneys to advertise as it was the right of
the public to have access to this type of commercial
information.
Bates galvanized bar associations across the country to
amend their disciplinary rules on advertising. Because the
decision was limited to the specific facts of the case,23 many
states rewrote their rules narrowly, preserving as much of the
old tradition as could be rationalized constitutionally. 24 The
Wisconsin Bar Association also proposed a very narrow and
specific set of rules which prohibited any form of advertising
not addressed by the Bates court.25 However, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected the Bar proposal, adopting instead a
very brief order which simply prohibited the use of any ad-
State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their
being kept in ignorance." Id. at 769. Commercial speech informs the public of the
availability, nature and price of products and services and thereby serves individual
and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decision making. Id. at 761-
65. In its decision, the Court specifically reserved judgment as to advertising by other
professionals such as physicians and lawyers. Id. at 773 n.25.
17. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72.
18. Id. at 372-75.
19. Id. at 375-77.
20. Id. at 377-78.
21. Id. at 378-79.
22. Id. at 379.
23. The Court held only that a state may not prevent the publication in a newspa-
per of truthful advertisements concerning the availability and terms of routine legal
services. Id. at 384. The Court declined to address claims as to the quality of legal
services or the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media. The
Court also added that because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal serv-
ices, reasonable regulations would still be permissible. Id. at 383-84.
24. Boden, supra note 10, at 555.
25. Id. at 555-56.
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vertisement which is false, misleading or deceptive.26 The
Wisconsin rule on lawyer advertising represented the most
liberal view in the country since it treated advertising by
lawyers no differently than advertising generally.2 7
The 1982 United States Supreme Court decision of In re
.. 28 affirmed the Wisconsin position. This decision
sounded the death knell for restrictive regulations by flatly
declaring that absolute prohibitions on speech are unconsti-
tutional.2 9 In R.M.J a Missouri attorney had been repri-
manded for violating the advertising rules of the Missouri
Supreme Court.3 0 His advertisement listed areas of practice
in language other than those specified by the rule31 and listed
the courts in which he was licensed to practice, something
not specifically permitted by the rule. He also violated the
rule by sending announcement cards to persons other than
other lawyers, clients, former clients and relatives. On ap-
26. See supra note 3. The one year period provided in the Supreme Court Order
was subsequently extended from December 31, 1978 to April 30, 1979. On April 30,
1979, the following Rule and Comment were adopted:
Rule:
A lawyer may advertise the lawyer's availability to provide legal services, pro-
vided that the use of any advertisement which is false, misleading, deceptive or
unfair shall constitute professional misconduct.
Comment:
Lawyers are officers of the court system, and their advertising should merit the
public's confidence in and respect for the administration of justice. The rule
permits the dissemination of objective, relevant information on which a person
may base an informed selection of competent counsel. Because there presently
is no state regulated plan to insure the existence of a lawyer's specialized com-
petence, it is misleading or deceptive to advertise that a lawyer is a specialist in
a particular field of practice other than the historically recognized special fields
of patent, trademark and admiralty law. It is permissible for a lawyer to ad-
vertise that he or she practices or does not practice in specialized fields. The
use of the word "specialization" or a synonym that connotes certified expertise
is misleading or deceptive.
88 Wis. 2d xxix (1979). The rule differs from the temporary one by adding a prohibi-
tion against "unfair" advertising. Id.
27. Boden, supra note 10, at 562.
28. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). Although the holding in Bates was a five-four split, the
decision in this case was unanimous.
29. Boden, supra note 10, at 562.
30. .MJ., 455 U.S. at 198.
31. Mo. ANN. RULES, Rule 4, DR 2-101(A) (Vernon 1981) listed 23 fields of law
which could be named in an advertisement. R.M.J. deviated from the list, using, for
example, "Personal Injury" instead of "Tort Law" and "Real Estate" instead of
"Property Law." R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 197.
[Vol. 67:168
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peal, the United States Supreme Court held that states may
not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of poten-
tially misleading information if the information may also be
presented in a way that is not deceptive.32 Nor may the states
impose an absolute prohibition on mailings and handbills
since other less restrictive means are available which would
insure against abuse or misleading information being
conveyed.33
In R.MJ the Court applied the Central Hudson Gas Co.
v. Public Service Commission34 test, which provides that
commercial speech which is not misleading and is not re-
lated to unlawful activity is constitutionally protected.
Under this test, commercial speech may not be restricted by
the state unless there is a substantial government interest to
be protected, the regulation directly advances that interest
and there is no less restrictive alternative available to protect
the interest in question .3  The effect of so stringent a test is
that only misleading lawyer advertising may be absolutely
prohibited; the Wisconsin Supreme Court wisely avoided re-
strictive regulations in setting forth its simple rule. 36
II. FACTS AND OPINION
Marcus and Tepper established their law firm in 1978.
They intended to develop a volume practice of middle in-
come clients through the use of advertising and fixed fees for
"routine" legal services such as adoption, bankruptcy, di-
vorce, real estate closings, will preparation and traffic of-
fenses. From August to October, 1978, they placed
advertisements in The Milwaukee Journal and The Milwau-
kee Sentinel.37 Several attorneys complained orally and in
32. RMJ., 455 U.S. at 203.
33. Id. at 206.
34. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
35. Id. at 564.
36. Young, Lawyer Advertising May Not Be Restricted Unless "Misleading," 68
A.B.A. J. 342 (1982). "The Court's unanimous holding on January 24 that advertising
by lawyers may be prohibited only when it is misleading appears to have invalidated
many state revisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility that attempted to steer
a course between prohibition of any ads by lawyers and unlimited professional adver-
tising." Id. at 342.
37. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 564-67,
320 N.W.2d 806, 809-10 (1982).
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writing to persons associated with the Board of Attorneys
Professional Responsibility.38 The Board filed a complaint
with the supreme court alleging that the ads were false, mis-
leading and deceptive. The court appointed a referee, and a
hearing was held on May 26 and 27, 1981.
At the hearing, the Board introduced the ads, the firm's
fee schedule, excerpts from answers to interrogatories and a
deposition of Mr. Marcus, and testimony of Mr. Tepper.
The evidence revealed that Mr. Marcus and an advertising
executive had created the ads, that the content was based on
Mr. Marcus' law and business experience, as well as conver-
sations with other attorneys, and that Mr. Tepper had re-
viewed and approved the ads. The Board presented no other
evidence.39
Two witnesses testified on behalf of Marcus and Tepper.
Professor Gerald Thain,4 ° of the University of Wisconsin
Law School, stated that "to a reasonable degree of advertis-
ing probability, the ads were not false, misleading or decep-
tive."' 4' Attorney James Brown, president of the Wisconsin
Consumers League, also testified that based upon his experi-
ence as a Milwaukee attorney and a consumer advocate, the
ads were not false, misleading or deceptive.42
The referee, the Honorable William C. Sachtjen, Reserve
Judge, issued a twenty-eight page report ordering that the
38. Wisconsin's Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility is charged with
the enforcement of the Model Code and the protection of the public from professional
misconduct by attorneys. The Board was established in 1978 and consists of both
attorneys and lay persons. It is completely separate from the state bar. It has several
disciplinary options and procedure is streamlined. When a complaint is filed, a refe-
ree, named by the chief justice, conducts a hearing on the matter. His findings are
filed with the clerk of the supreme court. Either the Board or the attorney may appeal
the matter to the supreme court. See In re Regulation of the Bar of Wisconsin, 74
Wis. 2d ix (1976).
39. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 568, 320 N.W.2d at 811.
40. Professor Thain had been an attorney with the Federal Trade Commission;
his responsibilities included reviewing of advertising by national advertisers and mak-
ing an initial determination as to whether the advertising was unfair or otherwise
contrary to trade regulations. Id.
Professor Thain is also the author of Thain, The Basics ofLawyer Advertisingfrom
a Regulatory Perspective, 53 Wis. B. BULL., May 1980, at 30.
41. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 568, 320 N.W.2d at 811.
42. Id. at 569, 320 N.W.2d at 811.
[Vol. 67:168
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complaint be dismissed on its merits. The Board appealed to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
The court first addressed the issue of which party bore
the burden of proof. The Board argued that the attorneys
should have the burden of proving the veracity of statements
in their advertisements. The court rejected this argument,
noting that generally in a disciplinary proceeding, the state
has the burden of showing a violation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility by clear and satisfactory evidence.43
The court also relied on language in Bates and R.MJ which
did not expressly allocate the burden, but implied it was the
state's duty to proceed. Therefore, the court decided, the
party seeking to impose discipline bears the burden of prov-
ing by clear and satisfactory evidence that the advertisement
violates the rule.44
The court then addressed the issue of whether the ads
were false, misleading and deceptive. The court held that
the ads were not misleading on their face. The court rea-
soned that the "argument as to whether fixed fees or time
charges best serve the public interest is a matter about which
reasonable minds may differ.' 45 The court also found the
ads were in fact not misleading because the Board offered no
proof that any client or member of the public had been
deceived by the ads.46 Therefore, the court ordered the com-
43. Id. at 570, 320 N.W.2d at 811.
44. Id. at 576, 320 N.W.2d at 815. In its analysis, the court did not define "mis-
leading." Thain, supra note 40, at 30 states four basic propositions concerning legal
deception in advertising by FTC standards:
a. Intent is irrelevant. If a representation has the tendency or capacity to
deceive, that is sufficient to constitute deception.
b. It is the overall impression which is significant, not the specific words
used, which determine whether something is deceptive.
c. It is not necessary that the advertisement deceive all its readers. It is
only necessary that a not insubstantial number of the potential consumers
might be deceived.
d. Failure to disclose material facts is deceptive, even in the absence of
any affirmative misstatements.
As these propositions indicate, what is most vital in determining if an ad-
vertisement is deceptive is the nature and response of its audience - the po-
tential consumers of the advertised goods or services. Id. at 31 (citations
omitted).
45. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 577, 320 N.W.2d at 815.
46. Id. at 579, 320 N.W.2d at 816.
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plaint against Marcus and Tepper dismissed on the merits.47
III. ANALYSIS
A. Comparison With Other Jurisdictions
Before In re M.J ,4 a minority of courts upheld the
constitutionality of restrictive advertising regulations. 49 The
most stringent restrictions absolutely prohibited any "pro-
motional content" in attorney advertising.50 The majority of
courts, however, relaxed restrictive advertising rules, partic-
47. Chief Justice Beilfuss, in a concurring opinion, stated that "these ads were
degrading and lack the sense of professionalism we should expect of lawyers. How-
ever, those characterizations are not sufficient to prohibit them." Id. at 581, 320
N.W.2d at 817 (Beilfuss, C.J., concurring).
48. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
49. In Lovett & Lindner, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981), a Rhode
Island law firm was disciplined for placing an ad in the front cover of the telephone
directory, rather than in the alphabetical listing under "lawyers," and for listing areas
of practice in its ads. The court struck down the rule restricting advertising to the
yellow pages, stating it was difficult to justify the rule as serving a significant govern-
mental interest, but upheld the prohibition against listing areas of practice. The court
found that the listing was misleading since readers would conclude that the attorney
was especially qualified in the areas of law mentioned. The court added that a dis-
claimer (stating that the listing implied no such specialization) was even more perni-
cious in that it deliberately states an untruth, namely, lack of expertise. Id. at 911.
Wisconsin specifically allows such listings. See supra note 26 and accompanying text
for text of Rule and Comment.
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Eaton v. Supreme Court of Ark., 270 Ark. 573,
607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), held that an advertisement which listed a fee of ten dollars for
an initial consultation was in violation of the state's disciplinary rules. The court
found that the ad did not meet the stated purpose of advertising legal services in that
there was no indication to the consumer how these attorneys were competitive in
price, other than for their initial consultation fee. Id. at __ 607 S.W.2d at 60. The
court also felt the method of dissemination was impermissible. The ad was included
in a packet of advertising materials mailed to households; the packet included cou-
pons for free french fries and discounts on dry cleaning, auto repair and health spa
memberships.
50. See, e.g., Bishop v. Committee of Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.
Iowa 1981). Iowa's disciplinary rules prohibited advertising that appealed to the
emotions, prejudices, likes or dislikes of its potential audience. Attorney Bishop
wanted to use restrained claims of quality in his advertising, such as "competent" and
"trustworthy," to characterize his fees as "reasonable," to advertise by nonpermitted
methods, such as direct mail, flyers, leaflets, billboards and telephone book covers,
and to participate in his own television ads, which were to include such backgrounds
as typewriters, sirens and file cabinet drawers closing. Bishop was allowed to charac-
terize his fees as "reasonable" since the ad in Bates had done so and to use direct
mail, but his other requests were denied.
[Vol. 67:168
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ularly where "routine" legal services were involved.5 1 In In
re Discipline of Appert,52 however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court allowed direct mail advertising regarding complex
and specialized product liability litigation. An attorney sent
letters and brochures to women who had been injured by
the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, advising them of their
legal rights and offering to represent them. The court stated
that the information in the letter and brochure made several
injured parties aware of their legal position, and absent ac-
cess to these materials, some of those individuals would not
have been aware of their rights.53 The court, applying the
Central Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission51 test,
held that the attorney's right to free speech and the public's
right to receive commercial information outweighed the
state interest being served by the advertising prohibition.5
Therefore, the state's interest was not sufficiently compelling
to justify a restriction of first amendment rights.5 6
Two decisions after R.M.J continued this trend. In Mc-
Lellan v. Mississippi State Bar Association57 the Mississippi
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a regulation prohibit-
ing all yellow page ads except those which contain no infor-
mation beyond the attorney's name, firm name, address and
51. In two similar decisions, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky.
1978) and Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d
872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981), the Kentucky Supreme Court and the
New York Court of Appeals struck down regulations which prohibited the mailing of
promotional literature to persons other than clients and former clients, other lawyers,
and personal friends. Both cases involved the mailing of letters by attorneys to real
estate brokers, advising that the law firm handled all aspects of real estate transactions
and noting their fees. The courts recognized that such advertising was more difficult
to police than that placed in the print or broadcast media, but that an absolute prohi-
bition was more restrictive than was necessary. The rules could be amended, for ex-
ample, to require an attorney desiring to use direct mail to file a copy of the letter or
leaflet with the state. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d at 934. This was the same conclusion subse-
quently reached in R.MJ., which noted that Rule 7.2(b) of the proposed Model Rules
of Professional Conduct requires that a "copy or recording of an advertisement or
written communication shall be kept for one year after its dissemination." RM.J.,
455 U.S. at 206 n.19.
52. 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981).
53. Id. at 210.
54. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
55. Appert, 315 N.W.2d at 212.
56. Id.
57. 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982).
1983]
MAIRQ UETTE LAW REVIEW [6
phone number.: 8 In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association
v. Schaeffer,59 the Oklahoma Bar brought disciplinary pro-
ceedings against an attorney on the basis of two advertise-
ments with an "emotional" content.60  The Oklahoma
Supreme Court dismissed the disciplinary proceeding
against attorney Schaeffer because the ads were not mislead-
ing and the state had shown no substantial interest being
served by restricting such advertisements.6'
The mandate from the United States Supreme Court is
clear: lawyer advertising, like other commercial speech, may
not be prohibited unless it is misleading. Based on Wiscon-
sin's obviously constitutional rule, the decision in Marcus &
Tepper seems to conform with the trend in other jurisdic-
tions, as well as with the Supreme Court position.
B. Bates and R.M. J
As a result of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 62 and In re
RLM.J ,63 states retain the authority to regulate advertising
that is inherently misleading or misleading in practice.'
However, the first and fourteenth amendments require that
58. McLellan's ad included his office hours, a statement that the initial consulta-
tion was free, and a notation that he had been licensed since 1968. The court, citing
R.MJ., said the ad could not be prohibited since it was not misleading, and that there
was no substantial state interest being promoted by the rule. "[A]dvertising by attor-
neys is constitutionally protected unless the [Bar] Association can justify prohibition
of such speech by an interest which will outweigh individual and societal interests in
the commercial speech. . . ." Id. at 707 (quoting Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568
S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978)).
59. 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982).
60. Id. at 358. The ads stated:
Advertisement #1:
adopt: to love and cherish as your very own. Perhaps you already love and
cherish your step-child ... .Even so, he may be losing certain benefits. A
legal adoption may give your step-child many of these benefits while telling
your step-child you want him as your very own.
Advertisement #2:
Need a lawyer? 5 days - or free. Within 5 working days after you provide us
with the information we need, we will file the necessary court documents, or if
filing is not appropriate, begin providing legal services - or our services are
free. Good for 30 days. DIVORCE NAME CHANGE WILLS INCORPO-
RATION ADOPTION.
61. Id. at 359.
62. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
63. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
64. R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 207.
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they do so with care and in a manner no more restrictive
than reasonably necessary.
In Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper,66
the Board hoped to prevail by establishing that the burden
of proof in lawyer advertising cases should be placed on the
advertising attorney. The Board's counsel argued that attor-
neys should be required to substantiate any claims made in
their ads and that "all unverified and unsubstantiated ads
must be viewed as having been made in reckless disregard of
the truth. ' 67 Since Marcus and Tepper could not substanti-
ate the claims in their ads, the Board insisted that no proof
on their part was necessary.
The Board also argued that for policy reasons the court
should place the burden of proof on advertising attorneys.
The Board stated that "with thousands of lawyers practicing
in Wisconsin, there is no way that this Court can insure the
clean flow of advertising if the burden of preventing and
remedying false, misleading, deceptive and unfair advertis-
ing is placed solely on the Board of Attorney's Professional
Responsibility. '68 It acknowledged, however, that generally
in disciplinary proceedings the state bears the burden of
proof. The Board provided no legal authority to support a
departure from this general principle.
The court rejected this argument stating that "[g]iven a
choice of reasonable interpretations of a rule, this court
should select a construction which renders the rule constitu-
tional. ' 69 The court found language in Bates and kMJ
65. Id.
66. 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982).
67. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper,
107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner].
The Referee's response to this was that:
[Sluch a rule would clearly contravene Bates because it would be an unreason-
able restriction upon the commercial free speech of lawyers, particularly when
the lawyers are expressing economic opinions rather than engaging in specific
comparison advertising. The power to require exact substantiation of all state-
ments made in any lawyer advertising would simply be a means of preventing
competitive types of advertising.
Brief for Petitioner at Appendix, Referee's Report at 24-25, Disciplinary Proceeding
Against Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Referee's Report].
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 9.
69. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 570, 320 N.W.2d at 812.
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which indicated that the state should bear the burden of
proof when attempting to restrict attorney advertising.7 ° In
order to be consistent with relevant United States Supreme
Court decisions the court concluded that in a disciplinary
action, the prosecuting party must bear the burden of
proof.7' Therefore, the Board was required to show, by clear
and satisfactory evidence, that the Marcus and Tepper ads
were misleading.
Once the burden had been so allocated, the court could
reach but one conclusion. Although the Board argued that
based on the court's knowledge of legal practice it could find
the ads inherently misleading,72 the court disagreed and
stated that the ads were not on their face misleading. They
express a belief that the fees charged by many attorneys are
higher than necessary, and that this is at least in part due to
high overhead, inefficiency, and the practice of charging by
the hour.73 The court noted that its conclusion was sup-
ported by the testimony of Professor Thain and Attorney
Brown.74
The Board also argued that several statements in the ads
were in fact misleading, such as: Marcus and Tepper possess
a high level of legal expertise,75 their clients realized an aver-
70. In Bates, the court concluded that "it has not been demonstrated that the ad-
vertisements at issue could be suppressed." 433 U.S. at 382 (emphasis added). The
opinion in R.M.J contained several statements indicating the burden was on the
state: "the listing published by the appellant has not been shown to be misleading,"
455 U.S. at 205 (emphasis added); "[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that the
inclusion of this information was misleading," id. at 205-06; "It]here is no finding that
appellant's speech was misleading." Id. at 206.
71. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 576, 320 N.W.2d at 815.
72. "As the body which has supervisory control of the practice of law, this Court
has knowledge of, and therefore needs no proof on, the nature or method of delivery
of legal services by lawyers or on the reasonable value of services." Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 67, at 17.
73. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 578, 320 N.W.2d at 815.
74. Id. at 579, 320 N.W.2d at 816. Professor Thain stated that this type of adver-
tising should be encouraged rather than prosecuted. Id.
75. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 18-19. The allegation that the claim of a
"high level of legal expertise" was misleading was made because although Mr. Tepper
was an experienced attorney, Mr. Marcus, though licensed, had never practiced law.
*The other two members of the firm were recent law school graduates. Marcus and




age savings of one-ha, 76 and the clients of other lawyers
must pay for the idle time of their lawyers.77 Although the
Board alleged that these statements were misleading, no
proof was provided.78 The court concluded:
The Board did not offer any proof that any client had
been charged more than the advertised fees, that clients did
not realize an average savings of one half; that attorneys
did not generally charge by the hour; or that the firm did
not possess "a high level of legal expertise."
Furthermore, the Board presented no evidence whatso-
ever that any clients of the firm or members of the lay pub-
lic were deceived by the ads or considered the allegations
therein "false, mis-leading or deceptive." 79
In light ofR.M.J, the court could not find that the evi-
dence introduced at the disciplinary hearing proved that the
Marcus and Tepper ads were misleading. Therefore, the
court dismissed the complaint.80
C Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association has now approved the Fi-
nal Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8 '
The five rules pertaining to advertising reflect the decisions
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona82 and In re RMJ.83 These
revised rules remove the advertising prohibitions that were
76. Id. at 19. The Board argued that the firm's hourly rate for services not cov-
ered by a "fixed fee" of fifty dollars per hour and their contingent fee, thirty percent,
did not represent a savings of one-half. Mr. Tepper testified that since the vast major-
ity of the firm's work consisted of the routine services for which fixed fees had been
set, he still believed that on the average the firm's clients realized a savings of one-
half or more. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 578, 320 N.W.2d at 815-16.
77. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 67, at 19.
78. The Referee devoted five pages of his report to what the Board did not prove.
Referee's Report, supra note 67, at 11-15.
79. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 579, 320 N.W.2d at 816.
80. Id. at 580, 320 N.W.2d at 816.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft Nov.
1982). The Model Rules, prepared by the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards, were submitted to the ABA's House of Delegates in August, 1982, at
the Association's Annual Meeting. Consideration of the rules continued when the
House of Delegates convened in New Orleans at the February, 1983, Midyear Meet-
ing of the Association, and the Rules were finally approved in August, 1983.
82. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
83. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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present in the 1969 code. The general rule prohibiting false
or misleading advertising by an attorney is stated in Rule
7.1.84 Rule 7.2 states a lawyer may advertise through public
media, written or broadcast, or through written communica-
tion not involving personal contact. 85  The situations in
which a lawyer may personally solicit professional employ-
ment are described in Rule 7.3.86 Rule 7.4 authorizes attor-
84. Rule 7.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not make false or misleading communication about the law-
yer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material representation of fact or law, or omits a fact neces-
sary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer
can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means
that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the
comparison can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (Proposed Final Draft Nov.
1982) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
85. Rule 7.2 provides:
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3(b), a lawyer may ad-
vertise services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal di-
rectory, newspaper or other periodical, radio or television, or through written
communication not involving personal contact.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication
shall be kept for [one year] after its dissemination along with a record of when
and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recom-
mending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable
cost of advertising or written communication permitted by this rule and may
pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal
service organization.
MODEL RULES, supra note 84, Rule 7.2.
86. Rule 7.3 provides:
(a) A lawyer may initiate personal contact with a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining professional employment only in the following circum-
stances and subject to the requirements of paragraph (b):
(1) if the prospective client is a close friend, relative, former cli-
ent or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client;
(2) under the auspices of a public or charitable legal services or-
ganization; or
(3) under the auspices of a bona fide political, social, civic, fra-
ternal, employee or trade organization whose purposes include but
are not limited to providing or recommending legal services, if the
legal services are related to the principal purposes of the
organization.
(b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to a pro-
spective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
[Vol. 67:168
ATTORAEY ADVERTISING
neys to list fields of practice in advertisements.8 7 Also, the
use of misleading firm names or letterheads is prohibited by
Rule 7.5.
Had the Model Rules been in effect in Wisconsin when
Marcus and Tepper ran their ads, the case may have been
decided differently. Rule 7.1(c) of the Model Rules provides
that the use of an advertisement that compares the lawyer's
services with other lawyers' services is misleading, unless the
comparison can be factually substantiated. Under this pro-
vision, the comments included in the Marcus and Tepper
ads might have been adjudged to be misleading. One of the
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physi-
cal, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person
could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer,
(2) the person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to
receive communications from the lawyer, or
(3) the communication involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
MODEL RULES, supra note 84, Rule 7.3 This rule also reflects recent Supreme Court
decisions on solicitation. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
87. Rule 7.4 provides:
A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not prac-
tice in particular fields of law. A lawyer shall not state or imply that the law-
yer is a specialist except as follows:
(a) a lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "patent attorney" or a
substantially similar designation;
(b) a lawyer engaged in admiralty practice may use the designation "admi-
ralty," "proctor in admiralty" or a substantially similar designation; and
(c) [provisions on designation of specialization of the particular state.].
MODEL RULES, supra note 84, Rule 7.4.
88. Rule 7.5 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional
designation that violates Rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in
private practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency or
with a public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in
violation of Rule 7. 1.
(b) A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same
name in each jurisdiction, but identification of the lawyers in an office of the
firm shall indicate the jurisdictional limitations of those not licensed to prac-
tice in the jurisdiction where the office is located.
(c) The name of a lawyer holding a public office shall not be used in the
name of a law firm, or in communications on its behalf during any substantial
period in which the lawyer is not actively and regnlarly practicing with the
firm.
(d) Lawyers may state or imply that they practice in a partnership or other
organization only when that is the fact.
MODEL RULES, supra note 84, Rule 7.5.
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ads included comments such as "lawyers traditionally charge
by the hour," and "most lawyers are content to wait for un-
solicited clients to come to them. So their clients have to pay
for the time they spend waiting." 89 The other stated that
most lawyers' rent is high, their volume is low and their
overhead is almost out of sight. The ads asserted that "law
firms traditionally charge by time and expenses." 90
Model Rule 7.1 (c) places the burden of proof on the ad-
vertising attorney, not on the state. Therefore, under the
Model Rules, Marcus and Tepper would have been required
to substantiate their claims. This may not have been possible
in light of the fact that Mr. Marcus could not recall the spe-
cific sources of his information.91 Under the provisions of
the Model Rule, if Marcus and Tepper had been unable to
substantiate their claims, the ads would have been found
misleading.92
D. Impact of the Decision
Discoilinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper93 repre-
sents the first test of Wisconsin's rule on attorney advertis-
ing. Prior to this decision, there was a great deal of
uncertainty as to how it would be applied. The Board, cog-
nizant of the potential problems involved in proving that ad-
vertising is misleading or deceptive, sought to place the
burden of proving the veracity of lawyer advertising on the
attorneys who placed the ads. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court refused to adopt this rule in light of the constitutional
protection afforded commercial speech.
Although a strong argument can be made that the Mar-
cus and Tepper ads were misleading,94 the Board presented
89. Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 320
N.W.2d 806, 809 (1982).
90. Id. at 567, 320 N.W.2d at 810.
91. Id. at 568, 320 N.W.2d at 811.
92. Justice Steinmetz in dissent argued that the comparisons were misleading,
stating "attorneys' fees are not 'mostly' set at an hourly rate." Id. at 587, 320 N.W.2d
at 820 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). He also found such claims as "the overhead of attor-
neys ... being 'out of sight'" and "the volume of cases of 'most lawyers' is low" to
be misleading and deceptive. Id. at 589, 320 N.W.2d at 820.
93. 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982).
94. See id. at 587-89, 320 N.W.2d at 820 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). However, it
was the Board's burden to establish the misleading nature of the ads by clear and
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no evidence of this.95 Had the Board presented clear and
satisfactory evidence showing the statements in the ad were
untrue, the result would have been different.
It should also be noted that the complaints filed against
Marcus and Tepper were filed not by consumers but by at-
torneys who felt the ads were disparaging to the legal profes-
sion.96 The purpose of the rule adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was to protect consumers regarding informa-
tion on legal services. Experts testified that "opening up"
the subject of fees may be beneficial to the public. 97
This is not to say that the Marcus & Tepper decision au-
thorizes all types of advertising in Wisconsin. However, the
decision does mandate that the party seeking to impose dis-
cipline for misleading advertisements substantiate that alle-
gation. Clear and satisfactory evidence that consumers have
been misled, or that an ad has a substantial potential to mis-
lead, will result in disciplinary action being taken against the
advertising attorney.
convincing evidence. They did not do so. The Referee's report, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, enumerated a series of issues on which the Board offered no
proof, such as: that the consumers of services that were advertised did not receive a
savings of 50% or more (the Referee commented that the Board could have attempted
to bring in witnesses familiar with prices to show the claim was untrue); that lawyers
do not "traditionally" charge by the hour, that the firm did not have a sufficiently
"high" level of legal expertise to practice law; or that the level of legal representation
was inadequate. Referee's Report, supra note 67, at 11-15. The Referee concluded
that there was a failure of proof to show the ads as a whole or any particular represen-
tations were false, misleading or deceptive. Id. at 20.
95. An argument that was not made as to the misleading nature of the ads is that
Marcus and Tepper compared their firm to large downtown firms with "overstuffed
chairs" and "fancy desks" who do extravagant client entertainment. Large downtown
firms do not generally handle the "routine" legal services like divorces, real estate
closings and will preparations that Marcus and Tepper advertised. Perhaps a com-
parison of their prices should have been made with those firms that provide compara-
ble services.
96. Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d at 568, 320 N.W.2d at 810-11. Chief Justice
Beilfuss, in his concurring opinion, also found the ads degrading. Id. at 581, 320
N.W.2d at 817 (Beilfuss, C.J., concurring).
97. Referee's Report, supra note 67, at 16. Professor Thain and Attorney Brown
testified that the ads were not "disparaging" to attorneys. Id. at 19. The Referee
concluded that the ads were not disparaging of the legal profession, and that the criti-
cism Marcus and Tepper leveled at the methods of charging by the hours does "not
tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice . . . . [S]uch
public differing within the profession could be healthy for the profession and the pub-




Disciolinary Proceeding Against Marcus & Tepper98 is im-
portant in that it has drawn guidelines for the Board of At-
torneys Professional Responsibility as well as for attorneys
who choose to advertise. Adoption of the Model Rules
would further facilitate this new area of American legal
practice by providing additional guidelines. 99
The essence of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona100 and the
lifting of the ban on lawyer advertising is not so much a rec-
ognition of an attorney's right to advertise as it is of the pub-
lic's right to information regarding legal services.' ° '
Restrictions on the consumer's right to know should be lim-
ited to those communications which are misleading, because
in those situations, the consumer is being deceived, not in-
formed. Lawyer advertising has increased each year since
Bates.'0 2 Any evils which have arisen from advertising have
been exceeded by the benefits accruing to lawyers and to the
public. 103
In re RM.J 104 indicates that lawyer advertising is to be
regulated no differently than other commercial advertising, a
position held in Wisconsin since Bates and applied in Mar-
98. 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982).
99. The Model Rules, although more detailed than Wisconsin's single rule, are in
effect a general prohibition against false, misleading or deceptive advertising. The
major distinction involves comparative advertising, in which the model rule shifts the
burden of proof to the advertising attorney.
This rule concerning comparative advertising was not adopted as a protectionist
measure but to follow FTC standards; the FTC would not allow, for example, pain
reliever.A to be compared favorably with pain reliever B unless the comparison can
be verified. Thus, a lawyer could not claim to settle suits three times faster than a
named competitor unless he could substantiate that claim.
100. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
101. Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 219 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
102. "Since 1978 the incidence of lawyer advertising has continued to increase.
Thirteen percent of 1983's respondents have advertised, compared to percentages of
10 in 1981, 7 in 1979, and 3 in 1978." Big Firms Favor P.R.; Little Firms LikeAds, 69
A.B.A. J. 892 (1983).
103. Figa, Lawyer Solicitation Today and Under the Proposed Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 393, 405 (1981). Figa cites a National Re-
source Center Study showing law firms receive an average of $7.93 in fees for each
dollar spent on advertising and an ABA study that concludes that lawyer advertising
is reducing the cost of legal services to the consumer for routine legal matters because
increased work resulting from advertising keeps down legal fees on a per client basis
and increases comparative shopping for lawyers by the public. Id. at 393 n.3.
104. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
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cus & Tepper. In place of the narrow, sometimes arbitrary,
restrictive regulations is a new standard: truthfulness. Most
lawyers will not abuse the privilege;'0 5 for those who do
mislead the public, there are sanctions available. The ulti-
mate winner in this newly developed area will be consumers
in need of legal services. "[P]eople will perceive their own
best interest if only they are well enough informed, and...
the best means to that end is to open the channels of commu-
nication, rather than to close them . .",,6
KAREN STEVENS
105. By avoiding detailed regulations governing lawyer advertising, the Model
Rules implicitly reflect trust in lawyers not to abuse the spirit of the advertising provi-
sions. See Figa, supra note 103, at 404.
106. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
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